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Cold War in the Aegean

Strategic imperatives, Democratic rhetoric: The United States and Turkey, 1945–52

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This study states that Turkish President İsmet İnönü did not use democracy merely as a tool to bring his country into the US-led Western alliance at the onset of the Cold War. Instead, İnönü was inspired by a true sense of mission to fulfil Atatürk’s legacy to bring democracy to Turkey. Admittedly, the Truman administration used democracy as rhetoric in order to realize its strategic goals in, and secure congressional aid for, Turkey, and yet Washington did not put pressure on Turkey to democratize faster or more thoroughly. There is no causal link between Turkey’s democratization and either the Truman Doctrine or Turkey’s admission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1952.

This article traces the parallel evolution of American–Turkish relations and Turkish democratization from 1945 to 1952. It shows how American officials disregarded the Turkish experiment with democracy when formulating policy even as they publicized the merits of Turkish democratization to the American people and the US Congress. US decision-makers knew that they needed Turkey as a bulwark against the Soviet Union in the eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East. To that end, officials in Washington pondered over ways to integrate Turkey to the emerging Western camp at the right moment and in the most cost-effective way.
From 1945 until 1952, US–Turkish relations were driven by realpolitik. American policy involved significant measures to promote closer ties between the United States and Turkey on the one hand and to garner domestic support for US objectives in Turkey on the other. The Truman administration used democracy as a rhetorical device in order to realize its goals in Turkey. The administration openly lauded the ‘development of Western democracy in Turkey’ but Turkey’s real importance for the United States lay in its location. The Americans, therefore, cared much more about internal stability in Turkey than the democratic nature of its regime. In fact, behind closed doors they often saw the two as contradictory.

Turkish President İsmet İnönü did not share that view. On 12 October 1945, he received Senator Claude Pepper (Democrat, Florida) and US Ambassador Edwin Wilson and told his guests that he wished to establish a genuinely representative democracy in Turkey, defining his criterion for success as follows: ‘The day when I can sit in the Assembly as leader of the Opposition, I shall regard my role in behalf of Turkey as fulfilled.’ The decision to open Turkish politics led to İnönü’s defeat in the general elections of 1950, fulfilling the veteran statesman’s wishes. As he put it years later, ‘my defeat was my greatest victory’.

Some observers, however, have portrayed İnönü as just another Turkish dictator. According to the historian Feroz Ahmad, İnönü had established a ‘virtual police state’ in Turkey during the Second World War. Moreover, given the economic troubles that the war brought to bear, Ahmad argues that İnönü could not hold together the political coalition of bureaucrats (military and civilian), landowners and business groups that Atatürk had built in the 1920s and 1930s. Therefore, so the argument, İnönü simply swam with the tide.

The political scientist Hakan Yılmaz states that İnönü did not really choose to democratize Turkey, but was compelled to do so by the structure of the international system. The world war and the ensuing troubles between the United States and the Soviet Union made clear that Washington would not welcome dictatorial regimes in Europe. Furthermore, Washington and London suspected Turkey’s desire to join their camp, given its neutrality during the recent world war. In this respect, Yılmaz maintains, İnönü was not idealistic; democratizing the country was only a foreign policy ploy to integrate Turkey with the newly emerging US-led Western camp. İnönü, according to this school, knew that he could not form closer relations with the United States if his country remained a dictatorship.

A more recent work by the political scientist John VanderLippe supports the above-stated arguments and claims that international relations – the desire to align with the United States, specifically – forced İnönü to liberalize Turkish politics. According to VanderLippe, İnönü lost control of the forces that he set in motion, which inadvertently led to his defeat in 1950.

The historian Cemil Koçak argues that the result of the Second World War influenced İnönü’s decision to democratize. Koçak also points to domestic factors, however, and warns us not to ‘exaggerate the role of international factors’ in its transition to democracy. Even though he does not go beyond 1945 in his analysis of
Turkish politics during the single-party era under İnönü (1938–45), Koçak correctly argues that, had the international system been the primary factor in democratizing US allies, Portugal and Spain should have democratized in the 1940s and 1950s as well.8

İsmet İnönü’s determination to continue his predecessor’s endeavours led to the creation of multi-party democracy in Turkey.9 Atatürk’s biographer Andrew Mango points out that Turkey’s ‘first republican constitution of 1924 enshrined the principles and set up the structures which allowed genuine parliamentary government to emerge from free elections in 1950. Atatürk left behind him the structure of a democracy, not of a dictatorship’.10 Following the Second World War, İnönü brought that project to its logical conclusion.

How did that legacy come about? With the end of the Ottoman Empire and the proclamation of the Republic in 1923, Turkey instituted a sweeping modernization programme under Atatürk. The secularization of the state, women’s emancipation with full political rights, and the adoption of the Latin alphabet instead of Arabic script were all part of this modernization. Atatürk also experimented with multi-party democracy twice in his lifetime but failed because political turmoil jeopardized the reforms. Following the Second World War, Atatürk’s successor İsmet İnönü felt that it was time to honour his predecessor’s mission and transform Turkey into a democratic state.

İnönü had been a firm believer in Atatürk’s mission. But a good deal of the time during his tenure as prime minister from 1923 until 1937 he did not brook much criticism when running the affairs of state. After leaving the prime ministry over personal and administrative differences with Atatürk, İnönü spent time learning English. His language of choice led him to works on Britain’s parliamentary democracy, which elevated his thinking on the relationship between statecraft and the need for a vibrant opposition. After becoming president in 1938, İnönü indicated that, had he and Atatürk weathered the opposition from the Progressive Republican Party in 1925 and the Free Party in 1930, Turkey could have had a more institutionalized and lively political system by the 1940s.11

For that reason, on 19 May 1945, on the symbolic anniversary of Atatürk’s commencement of the Turkish War of Independence in 1919 and eleven days after the surrender of Nazi Germany, İnönü made the following declaration: ‘As the restrictions necessitated by the precautionary measures of the war are gradually lifted, the principles of democracy will gain wider prevalence in our political and intellectual life’.12 The following November, İnönü invited dissatisfied members in his Republican People’s Party (RPP), namely Adnan Menderes, Celal Bayar, Refik Koraltech, and Fuat Köprülü, to form a new political party.

Upon its formation, the new Democrat Party (DP) posed a formidable challenge to the RPP’s parliamentary majority. Even though RPP partisans initially responded with strong-arm tactics to intimidate DP members, İnönü’s mediations saved the political system from breaking down and reverting to authoritarianism. İnönü relaxed restrictions on political campaigning and free speech while promoting free elections and a free press. He even distanced himself from his own party in order to maintain some form of neutrality between the RPP and the DP. In the period from 1945 until
1950, İnönü’s support for liberals in the RPP and his fair treatment of the DP made democratization possible.\(^{13}\)

International politics witnessed upheavals while Turkish politics took a new direction in 1945. Disagreements between Washington and Moscow surfaced almost as soon as the war ended. And President Harry Truman complained that he was tired of ‘babying the Soviets’.\(^{14}\) In this context, decision-makers in Washington struggled to retain US preponderance around the world. According to the historian Melvyn Leffler, soon after the war ended officials in the Truman administration ‘intended to promote world peace and foster international stability at the same time that they safeguarded national security, perpetuated American power, and further augmented American prosperity’.\(^{15}\) US strategy at the end of the Second World War was to keep the Western Hemisphere and key parts of Eurasia free from Soviet domination. ‘If Eurasia came under Soviet domination, either through military conquest or political and economic “assimilation”, America’s only potential adversary would fall heir to enormous natural resources, industrial potential, and manpower.’\(^{16}\) The regeneration of America’s European and Asian allies depended on the oil reserves of the Middle East. Turkey’s location and not its political regime formed the cornerstone of these considerations.

The first test of Turkey’s importance emerged as the war drew to a close. On 19 March 1945, Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav M. Molotov informed the Turkish Ambassador Selim Sarper that the renewal of the Turkish–Soviet Friendship Treaty of 1925 was conditional upon a ‘joint’ Turkish–Soviet defence of the Dardanelles and the Bosporus. A few months later, the Soviets also asked Turkey to cede its eastern provinces of Kars and Ardahan. When Soviet leaders raised the question at the Potsdam Conference in July 1945, Prime Minister Winston Churchill and President Truman did not object to the idea of a regime change for the Straits. Without committing themselves to a specific course, they agreed to work in tandem for the revision of the Montreux Convention of 1936 that governed regime of the Turkish Straits.\(^{17}\)

Soviet policy-makers asked for a revision because the security of their southern flank worried them. Germany had attacked their country twice in less than 25 years; they wanted to make sure that they would not suffer the same fate again.\(^{18}\) But the stridency of their demands from Turkey dealt a severe blow not only to the ‘Grand Alliance’, but also to Moscow’s relations with Ankara, which had been friendly since the 1920s. In fact, in a meeting with the Turkish high command as late as July 1945, President İnönü expressed his wish to remain on friendly terms with the Soviets. The Turkish president observed that it would be ideal for Turkey to be allied with Britain and the Soviet Union. Whichever power would put pressure on Turkey in the future, he calculated that Turkey would tilt to the other side; in a confrontation between the two, Turkey could simply remain neutral.\(^{19}\) As Moscow pressed for base rights and territory, however, it pushed Turkey to the American side.

The Soviet–Turkish dispute worked in tandem with problems in neighbouring countries. A crisis was in the making in Iran in early 1946, when Moscow seemed reluctant to withdraw its troops and support for Azeri and Kurdish revolutionary nationalists seeking independence. The young Mohammed Reza Shah’s government
restored sovereignty in north-west Iran later that year only after much diplomatic manoeuvring and the assistance of the US government.  
Concurrently in Greece, a communist insurgency began to threaten the pro-Western regime.  
The partisan resistance against Nazi occupation during the war turned into armed opposition to the conservative government in Athens after liberation. Although there was probably more local agency in the events in Greece than outside meddling, together with the problems in Turkey and Iran, Washington believed that Moscow manipulated the troubles.  
The belief in Soviet meddling in Greece, Turkey, and Iran hardened Anglo-American resolve. At the Moscow conference of foreign ministers in December 1945, British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin told his American counterpart James Byrnes that ‘Britain could not agree to the Soviet request for a base in the Straits and for the return of Kars and Ardahan’. Secretary of State Byrnes agreed and the United States backed the British position. The line of reasoning was quite similar to that of the domino theory: If Greece, Turkey, or Iran fell under Soviet rule, each would become more vulnerable.  
The domination of one would eventually force the others to acquiesce to Soviet pressure. With direct access to the Persian Gulf and/or the eastern Mediterranean, the USSR would be strengthened, the American and British positions would be weakened, and Western Europe’s vital oil supplies would be jeopardized. Ten months later, the State Department’s director of Near East and African affairs, Loy Henderson, summarized Turkey’s importance in similar terms: ‘Strategically, Turkey is the most important factor in the eastern Mediterranean and Middle East’. By its geographical position, Henderson continued, ‘Turkey constitutes the stopper in the neck of the bottle through which Soviet political and military influence could most effectively flow into the eastern Mediterranean and Middle East’.  
Aside from the objective of protecting Middle East oil, US officials also feared the possibility of a protracted war with the Soviet Union. They formulated plans to destroy Soviet infrastructure by bombing oil facilities and industries in the Caucasus, the Urals, the Ukraine, and Ploesti (Romania). In the event of a war, US officials estimated that the Soviets would easily overrun Western Europe. In order to debilitate Soviet capabilities, the United States would have to strike at the USSR’s industrial base and its access to raw materials. Turkey would serve as a defence of the main Allied base in the Cairo–Suez area from which major air strikes against the Soviet Union would be launched. Moreover, the Turkish army would slow down the Soviet advance towards the Middle East.  
From November 1945 until August 1946, Washington, Moscow, and Ankara tried to resolve the question of the Straits, but to no avail. Parallel to their demands, the Soviets were reportedly amassing troops into Bulgaria and the Caucasus for a possible attack against Turkey. For President Truman, these moves constituted ‘an open bid to obtain control of Turkey’ and he believed that the proposal for a joint defence of the Straits was a pretext to control Turkey. In a meeting on 15 August, Truman suggested to Undersecretary of State Dean Acheson, Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal, Acting Secretary of the Navy Kenneth C. Royall, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), that the Soviets ‘should be resisted at all costs’. Asked if he grasped the full implications of such
a course of action, Truman reportedly said that he would go all the way: ‘We might as well
find out whether the Russians are bent on world conquest now as in five or ten years’.[31]
In the end, not only did the Kremlin fail to secure Turkish neutrality and/or control
over the Straits, but unsophisticated efforts to bring Turkey into its sphere of influence
also yielded the opposite outcome: the commencement of the American–Turkish
alliance. Years later, Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov conceded that he and Stalin had
made a mistake in demanding the joint defence of the Straits and Turkish territory.[32]

While Turkey resisted Soviet demands, important domestic events occurred. Some
moderates within the RPP broke off and formed the DP in November 1945. Neither at
this point nor later did the Americans pull the strings or exert pressure on İnönü. On
the contrary, Ambassador Edwin Wilson voiced misgivings at the beginning of the
experiment, which policy-makers in Washington shared:

While President [İnönü] sincerely desires and intends to proceed on [the] road to
political democracy, [the] international situation, particularly relations with Russia,
will make it inadvisable at [the] present time to risk throwing [the] country into
possible confusion and agitation of direct elections free of [the] control by [the]
People’s Party.[33]

On 21 July 1946, Turkey held its first direct multi-party general elections (as
opposed to previous ones where constituents voted for electoral colleges). The
elections took place in an atmosphere of relative freedom. In fact, in comparison to
present-day Turkey, where, until recently, the press was barred from estimating results
lest it influence voters, a quick look at the newspapers of July 1946 reveals the freedom
they enjoyed. Prior to the elections, the pro-opposition Vatan reported that the DP
had a decent chance of winning. Its chief editor Ahmet Emin Yalman referred to the
forthcoming elections as ‘judgement day’ for the RPP.[34]

But the elections of 1946 were hardly the finest hour of Turkish democracy. ‘Ballots
were in most cases burned within twenty-four hours after the polling, so that no
recount was possible’, reported Herbert Bursley, counsellor of the US embassy. At any
rate, that the DP could not contest 114 of the seats because it did not run in 16
provinces (in fact, RPP deputies moved the elections, normally scheduled for 1947, to
July 1946 to ensure that outcome), almost guaranteed an RPP victory. In many places,
some officials rigged the counting to assure Republican victory. Despite reporting the
transgressions, Bursley sounded happy with the stability created by the RPP victory,
which was far more important for the Americans than free and fair elections.[35]

The elections of 1946 did not alter US policy towards Turkey; on the contrary,
geopolitics prevailed. On 8 January 1947, Ambassador Walter Bedell Smith wrote from
Moscow and admonished Washington that Turkey was militarily in a vulnerable
situation and that Britain’s support for Turkey was waning. If Turkey did not receive
military and economic aid from the United States, it ‘had no hope of surviving’. On
24 February, British officials informed their American counterparts that they would no
longer be able to allocate any resources for Greece and Turkey and asked the
Americans to assume British commitments.
The episode is illuminating because, as a non-participant in the Second World War, Turkey logically did not experience the post-war financial difficulties of other European countries; there were no food shortages or communist uprisings. According to Ambassador Wilson, Turkey had a gold reserve of $230 million which covered nearly 70 per cent of its note issues and he believed that 'the Turks did not need that much gold'.\textsuperscript{37} Its defence expenditure (nearly one-quarter of the fiscal budget) did burden the country, but at a time when shortages hit Europe and political turmoil shook the Middle East, Turkey was doing relatively well.

In neighbouring Greece, which had suffered greatly in the Second World War, the situation was precarious. The elections of 31 March 1946 did not produce stability and the country plunged into further chaos. The mayhem that communist guerrillas caused and the prospect of Greece falling under Soviet influence increasingly troubled London and Washington, prompting the latter to take action.\textsuperscript{38}

On 12 March 1947, President Truman addressed a joint session of Congress and requested $400 million for Greece and Turkey. In his historic speech (in which he proclaimed the doctrine named after him), Truman stated that 'it must be the policy of the United States to support the free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures'. Since Britain was about to cease aid to the two countries, the United States had to assume its duties.

In order to strengthen his case, Truman mentioned the Greek general elections of 1946 and claimed that the Greek government represented 'eighty-five per cent of the members of the Greek parliament'. Although he conceded that the Greek government had 'made mistakes', President Truman argued that 'under democratic processes', those mistakes could be 'pointed out and corrected'. 'Greece', he bluntly told Congress, 'must have assistance if it is to become a self-supporting and self-respecting democracy'. Interestingly, Truman did not make a similar case for Turkey; he did not mention the ongoing transition to democracy. In fact, he spoke only briefly about Turkey, reiterating the domino rationale: 'If Greece should fall under the control of an armed minority, the effect upon its neighbour, Turkey, would be immediate and serious. Confusion and disorder might spread throughout the entire Middle East'.\textsuperscript{39}

American decision-makers focused on regional stability when supporting Turkey. Joseph Jones witnessed the evolution of the Truman Doctrine as special assistant to the Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs. He described the American rationale at the time as follows: 'If Greece fell to communist control, Turkey, three-quarters encircled, would also fall in time. [The] whole of the Middle East, South Asia, and North Africa would be laid open to Soviet adventuring', which would have disastrous implications for Western Europe's access to raw materials.\textsuperscript{40} Similarly, the day after Truman's speech, the JCS warned Secretary of War Robert Patterson that 'should Russia dominate Turkey in peace time, [it would be] highly probable that all the Middle East countries would then come rapidly under Soviet domination'. 'If Russia can absorb Turkey in peace', the JCS memorandum followed, 'our ability to defend the Middle East in war will be virtually destroyed'.\textsuperscript{41}
The Truman administration wanted to improve Turkey’s military capabilities as a means to protect US interests in the region. The State Department’s Greece–Turkey assistance committee held that ‘the program of aid to Turkey will be primarily one of military aid and that aid for economic projects should be limited to those directly related to the military program’.

Ambassador Wilson wrote from Ankara that ‘money spent on Turkish armed forces can be considered [a] national life-insurance premium for the United States’. Should war erupt in the future, the Soviets would seek to overrun Turkey rapidly. ‘Because of her strategic position’, Wilson continued, ‘Turkey actually becomes the first line of defence for the United States in any aggressive move by Russia.’

After the declaration of the Truman Doctrine, the administration began to use a more nuanced tone, justifying its Turkish policy before the Republican Congress by using the rhetoric of democracy. By positioning ‘democracy’ and ‘freedom’ against ‘communist expansion’ and ‘totalitarianism’, the executive wanted to assure the backing of the American people and their elected representatives. The historians Les Adler and Thomas Paterson point out that following the Second World War many Americans made a direct connection between communism and fascism and the former came to be called ‘Red Fascism’. Americans were acquainted with Nazi Germany but they were less familiar with the USSR. Once their leaders declared the Soviets the new ‘enemy’, the American people switched their hatred for Hitler’s Germany to Stalin’s Soviet Union with considerable ease.

Republican congressmen went along with the administration’s rhetoric. In fact, it was Senator Arthur Vandenberg (Republican, Michigan), chairman of the Senate foreign relations committee, who had suggested to Secretary of State George C. Marshall and Undersecretary of State Acheson that they explain the dangers of Soviet expansion to the American people in powerful terms. In a meeting on 27 February 1947, Vandenberg pledged to support Truman if he would ‘shock Congress into action’. On the day after President Truman’s speech, Vandenberg insisted that the American people had to have a firm understanding of what was at stake and why the Soviet Union constituted a real threat. In order to do that, Vandenberg believed that Congress and the administration had ‘to dramatize this thing in every possible way’.

Officials in the executive branch followed suit. Before the aid bill passed Congress, they legitimated their approach by alluding to Turkey’s democratic transition. When asked in a hearing by the Senate foreign relations committee on whether Turkey was a democracy, Acheson replied that Turkey had a representative parliament, which was elected in July 1946 ‘after a free political campaign’. Turkey, Acheson maintained, was ‘essentially democratic’ and was ‘progressing along the road of democracy’.

The language of democracy, however, did not make the administration’s job easier. The Republicans had won the mid-term elections in 1946 and they strongly opposed Truman’s policies. Many congressmen fervently objected to giving aid to Greece and Turkey precisely on the grounds that the administration defended its merits. As they saw it, both countries disregarded basic human rights and might use American aid to suppress the opposition. Representative George H. Bender (Republican, Ohio) was by far the most vocal critic of Turkey. In a speech on the House floor, Bender contended
that ‘it will be an unparalleled act of hypocrisy for this House to vote an act which guarantees the freedom of the press to the American newspapers when that freedom does not exist in Turkey today’. ‘That arrogant Turkish military dictatorship is asking us for money’, Bender continued, ‘with the full knowledge that they intend to violate every provision required by the Congress’. He asked his fellow congressmen not to be fooled by ‘an arrogant State Department into a completely hypocritical position’. 48

Challenging the Democratic advocates of the aid plan, some Republican senators agreed with Bender: Turkey was not a democracy and had remained neutral during most of the Second World War. Why not, they asked, ‘let Greece and Turkey pass into the communist world? The two nations would simply be changing one form of undemocratic government for another’. 49

In order to rebut objections, the Truman administration defended the aid on the grounds that, while alleviating Turkey’s domestic and foreign burdens, it would help to establish a full-fledged democracy. The State Department’s Greece–Turkey assistance committee similarly pointed out that ‘a cardinal objective of US policy is a world in which nations shall be able to work out their own way of life free of coercion by other nations’. The US goal was to help the Greeks and Turks to develop their institutions. 50

Strengthening democracy in Greece and Turkey would have a ripple effect in the region as well. As Acheson said at one point, ‘the prompt extension of aid proposed to Greece and Turkey would have the effect of encouraging constructive, democratic forces in other areas and thereby reducing the possibility of similar situations arising elsewhere’. 51 By using the rhetoric of democracy, the administration hoped to erode the opposition to military aid.

On 22 May 1947, Congress approved the Greek-Turkish aid bill by a vote of 287 to 107 in the House and 67 to 23 in the Senate. 52 A few months later, the preamble of the aid agreement between the United States and Turkey laid out the fundamental logic of the agreement in terms of bolstering Turkish defence. US assistance would enable Turkey ‘to strengthen its security forces and to maintain the stability of her economy’. 53 Over the next year, US military aid for Turkey totalled $100 million. The sum included mostly military hardware, but also some machinery for public works. At a time when the Turkish fiscal budget stood slightly over a billion liras ($361 million), the American aid gave Turkey a much-needed boost. 54

Following the elections of July 1946, İnönü looked for a prime minister who could be conciliatory towards the DP and be firm enough to withstand the storms of multi-party democracy. Failing to find a suitable candidate, İnönü turned to the rather unlikely character of Recep Peker, who was known for his dislike of democracy.

Why did İnönü choose Peker? The answer probably lies in Peker’s background. Owing to his organizational skills and vigorous character, Peker had served as secretary-general of the RPP and as minister in different cabinets throughout the 1920s and 1930s. Ataturk, who had been the chairman of the RPP as well as President, had also liked Peker personally. But Peker’s 1936 report, which he wrote after a research trip to Europe and suggested that the RPP be reorganized along the lines of the Italian Fascist Party to make it more appealing to the general public, had met with Atatürk’s
hostility. Atatürk had expressed his displeasure to his chief secretary Hasan Rıza Soyak as follows: ‘Even those closest to me do not understand what I want for Turkey. My intention is that should an anti-monarchical current take over the world in the future, even those who demand a sultanate can form a party in this country.’\textsuperscript{55} In response, Atatürk had dismissed Peker from the Secretariat-General. Despite falling from grace, however, Peker remained an important figure in the RPP.

Peker’s prime ministry, which lasted from July 1946 until September 1947, proved the most critical part of Turkey’s democratization and revealed İnönü’s centrality to that process. During that period, the RPP and the DP constantly clashed. Veteran members led by Peker and the liberal minority within the RPP quarrelled as well. Especially after Peker decided to devalue the Turkish lira by nearly 100 per cent in September 1946, the DP’s criticisms against him hardened. Peker, in turn, put more pressure on the DP. During a parliamentary debate, he called Adnan Menderes, a leading DP deputy, a ‘psychopath’ for criticizing his economic programme\textsuperscript{56}.

Frustrated with Peker’s bullying and his boorish manners, the DP began boycotting Grand National Assembly of Turkey (GNAT) meetings on 23 December 1946. President İnönü, fearing that a prolonged DP absence would embolden radicals within the RPP, held a series of talks between the two sides for the next few days and advised moderation. On 27 December, thanks to İnönü’s efforts, DP deputies returned to their seats.\textsuperscript{57}

Yet neither Recep Peker nor the Democrats behaved themselves for too long. As the by-elections of 6 April 1947 for the Assembly approached, members of the two parties resumed hostilities (back then, Turkey held separate local and national by-elections once every few months). In many localities, DP and RPP members campaigned with too much enthusiasm. A few rallies and counter-rallies, such as the one in the town of Manisa in western Turkey a few days before the elections, ended with injuries. DP leaders used the incident and Peker’s deeds as a pretext to boycott the by-elections of 6 April. On the one hand, the Democrats wanted to draw domestic and international attention to Peker’s actions. But, more importantly, DP officials did not want to risk their political credibility in a possible RPP victory, no matter how small and how distant from the general elections of 1950.\textsuperscript{58}

In this instance, President İnönü felt slighted. Peker’s behaviour risked annulling his mediation of December 1946. He had already promised the Democrats that they had nothing to worry from the government. Now Peker made him look unreliable. Moreover, İnönü thought that the DP also worked behind his back by signalling to the Americans that Turkey’s budding democratic regime was nothing but a sham. Aware that the United States did not care much for Turkish democracy for its own sake, İnönü feared that Washington would see democratization as incompatible with containing communism, and would either stop delivering military aid or put pressure on him to shelve the experiment.\textsuperscript{59}

Such concerns led İnönü to talk to the two sides from May through July 1947 once again. After resolving the second rift between the DP and the RPP, he made the following declaration on 12 July 1947: ‘I have received the Prime Minister’s statement – that the government is in no way suppressing the opposition – and passed this on to
Mr. Bayar. The president also assured Peker that the opposition did not seek a revolution but exercised its rightful duty to criticize the government. İnönü carefully admonished Peker to remember his ‘responsibilities with respect to peace and order’ and ‘impartial and equal treatment of legitimate and lawful political parties as the basic requirement for a safe political life’.60

İnönü’s second intercession irritated Peker. Hoping to assume complete control over the RPP, he asked for constitutional amendments that would increase the prime minister’s power. Peker failed to get his way and resigned in September 1947. Had he succeeded, he would have effectively replaced İnönü as the leader of Turkey and put a stop to the country’s evolution towards democracy.

Meanwhile, the Truman administration continued publicizing Turkish democracy inside America. During the budget debates in February 1948, the State Department sent a report to Congress asking for the continuation of aid. Foggy Bottom argued that by keeping military assistance to Turkey, Congress would be strengthening Turkish democracy while enhancing US security: ‘By virtue of its peculiar geographic situation and because of the Westward orientation of its political concepts, the maintenance of Turkey’s freedom and independence is of vital importance to the security of the entire Middle East’. More importantly, the report followed, ‘in resisting the current tide of Soviet expansion, Turkey is holding the fort not only for the Arab states with their vital petroleum reserves, but for the entire eastern Mediterranean basin’.61

That month, Cold War tensions worsened as communists seized power in Czechoslovakia. This event hastened American efforts to secure West European countries through the Marshall Plan. In the second half of 1948, Washington also began working on what would become the North Atlantic Treaty (NAT), a military-political alliance aimed to shield Western Europe from the perceived Soviet threat.

The development of the NAT made the Turks uneasy because Washington refused to consider Ankara’s membership in the new arrangement. Upon becoming the Turkish ambassador to the United States in August 1948, Feridun Cemal Erkin observed that ‘the West Europeans and America are not ready to accept us [into] the new security system’.62 Even though Erkin told American diplomats that it should be perfectly sensible to have Greece and Turkey as signatories to the NAT (since the French pushed for the membership of Italy, hardly an Atlantic littoral state either), Washington and London sidelined Athens and Ankara.

Once it became obvious that they would not be allowed to join the NAT, the Turkish side pressed for a bilateral pact with the United States. According to George McGhee, who served as Assistant Secretary of State from 1949 until 1951 and then as Ambassador to Turkey from 1951 until 1953, Ankara feared that in the absence of a security pact, the Soviets would gain ‘the impression that the United States [was leaving] Turkey undefended’.63 On 10 September 1948, Ambassador Erkin told Joseph Satterthwaite of the State Department’s division of Near Eastern affairs that ‘the independence and territorial integrity of Turkey as a factor of freedom, order, and justice in the Near and Middle East are indispensable and of vital importance for the maintenance of peace and security [in] the Mediterranean area, which are inseparably linked with the peace
and security of the Atlantic and the United States.\textsuperscript{64} Even though Turkish officials sought to enhance their country’s interests by highlighting its political significance, they could not commit the Americans to a course of action.

As they ignored Turkish requests, American policy-makers did not pay too much attention to Turkey’s democratization when they implemented policy. Yet they liberally complimented Turkey in public for its political progress. On 29 October 1948, on the occasion of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the foundation of the Republic of Turkey, President Truman delivered a short statement over \textit{Voice of America}. In his address, Truman lauded ‘the decision of the Turkish nation to continue the development of democratic institutions and to further safeguard human rights and liberties [as] being carried out at a time when these ideals – so dear to all Americans – are being ruthlessly crushed and obliterated in many parts of the world’.\textsuperscript{65} An interesting use of semantics and reflective of US policy towards Turkey, Truman exalted Turkish democratization while subtly scolding the Soviets. The real audience was probably the American people; \textit{Voice of America} did not broadcast in Turkish at the time and it is doubtful how many Turks listened to the English transmission. In essence, the Truman administration promoted Turkish democracy not in Turkey, but in the United States, to the American people.

On 4 April 1949, the United States, Canada, and ten European nations signed the NATO in Washington. In order to avoid exclusion, Ankara launched a public relations campaign in the United States at once. Turkish Foreign Minister Necmettin Sadak came to Washington a few days after the signing of the NATO. That same month he also wrote an article entitled ‘Turkey Faces the Soviets’ for the journal \textit{Foreign Affairs}. In his article, Sadak rendered a lengthy account of how the Soviet Union, since the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact of August 1939, longed to control Turkey. Even though the Soviet Union had not raised the issue of the Straits and border changes after August 1946, Sadak argued that the Soviets nevertheless constituted a threat to Turkey and suggested that his country be granted membership.\textsuperscript{66}

Until joining NATO in 1952, Turkish officials complained that their exclusion put both Turkey and the United States in a precarious position vis-à-vis the USSR. In his meeting with Secretary of State Dean Acheson on 12 April 1949, Foreign Minister Sadak expressed his disappointment that Turkey, ‘the European nation most exposed to Russian attack, was being left outside of Western security arrangements’. Acheson told Sadak that Turkey’s importance had not diminished but he conceded that it would not be possible for a while to forge a formal security pact between Turkey and the United States. As Ambassador Erkin recalled, Acheson assured Sadak that the NATO would not discourage the United States from supporting Turkey in the event of Soviet aggression.\textsuperscript{67} Two months later, Erkin met with State Department officers, who advised him that the lack of a formal alliance did not signify a decrease in US commitments to Turkey. The time was just not right.\textsuperscript{68}

Erkin, however, did not relent and kept pressing Foggy Bottom. On 13 October 1949, he surveyed the possibility of a linkage between Turkey’s 1939 Treaty of Alliance with Britain and France and the NATO. John Jernegan, director of the State
Department’s newly created Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs (GTI), rebuffed Erkin’s attempt.69 Two months later, Erkin again raised the issue with Deputy Undersecretary Dean Rusk. Rusk asked whether Turkey would consider revising the clauses of the 1939 agreement that did not obligate Turkey to join Britain and France if they went to war with the Soviet Union. The Turkish ambassador responded affirmatively, although this did not produce any results either.70

Democracy did not factor into US planning even after the creation of the Atlantic Pact. The rhetoric of democracy, on the other hand, continued to appear in reports sent to Congress and in the public speeches of American officials. The State Department’s Policy Statement of 5 May 1949 prioritized US military aid to Turkey as follows: ‘Turkey’s military strength will make available to the US and to our allies the use of this vitally strategic area as a base of operations in the event of war, and conversely deny the Soviet Union and its satellites access to its land and resources’.71 The second objective was ‘to assist, by appropriate means, that government’s determined and successful efforts to achieve a fuller democracy and a more productive economy, and thus to counteract the infiltration of communism and Soviet influence not only in Turkey but in adjacent countries to the south and east’.72 A subsequent State Department report, dated 20 June, fortified the case for Turkey in dramatic terms: ‘In the midst of troubled waters, Turkey has emerged as an island of stability. [While] the Near East in general remains unstable, and the trend in the Balkans is toward totalitarianism, in the last few years Turkey has been moving at an accelerated pace toward democracy as we understand it in the West’. The same report delineated the causes of democratization as ‘internal unity, resulting from a relatively homogeneous and contented people, [and] good leadership’. Moreover, the Turkish constitution embodied ‘most of the progressive principles common to the American, French, and English constitutions’.73

More public praise for Turkey continued. Assistant Secretary of State George Allen addressed the Turkish-American Society in New York on 28 October 1949. Allen spared no emotions and contrasted the Turkish Revolution with its Bolshevik counterpart: ‘The struggle for [the cause of human freedom] is epitomized in the history of the Turkish Republic. [I]t has always been a source of amazement to me that two nearly simultaneous revolutions in two neighbouring territories, the Russian Empire and the Ottoman Empire, should have had such opposite results’. ‘In Russia’, said Allen, ‘revolution brought the extinction of freedom, [but in Turkey] it resulted in a great increase of freedom’.74 Allen’s speech, just like Truman’s in October 1948, demonstrated how American policy-makers used democratic sympathies in public to defend the ‘containment’ of the Soviet Union and their policy towards Turkey.

About the same time, the DP and the RPP prepared themselves for the upcoming general elections of May 1950. Fearing a breakdown similar to 1946–47, İnönü went on a tour of the Aegean region in August 1949. The trip was less of a political campaign than İnönü’s effort to impress upon the people that democracy entailed responsible behaviour. In İzmir, he told to a group of factory workers that ‘every political party and opinion will approach you and ask for votes. I don’t have anything to do with them’. ‘What I am interested in’, İnönü went on, ‘is to provide the setting
in which citizens of all opinions can work together as siblings. A few days later, he
warned a crowd in the town of Aydın that ‘I am not going to deliver heaven-on-earth
to you. That is for you to find’. İnönü promised, however, to hand over ‘the key to all
the heavens, [to] all things pleasant’ by fulfilling his promise of democracy.\textsuperscript{75}

His political opponents, particularly DP chairman Celal Bayar, appreciated İnönü’s
sincerity about democratization. Years later, and even after intense bickering with İnönü
in the 1950s, Bayar told his opponent’s son-in-law, the journalist Metin Toker, that
İnönü ‘could have sent two gendarmes over and closed down the Party [DP]. And
nothing would have happened’.\textsuperscript{76} Even as defeat became obvious a few days before the
elections of May 1950, İnönü did not take that route and accepted his first electoral loss.

On 14 May 1950, the DP won nearly 420 out of 480 seats in the Assembly, thanks to
the winner-takes-all system. The results gave the Truman administration great
justification for its Turkish policy. The State Department, for its part, described the
outcome as a ‘victory for democracy’.\textsuperscript{77} A few days later, George McGhee intimated
that the elections would serve as ‘excellent Turkish propaganda’ for the Truman
administration and ‘a very good reply to domestic critics who complain about our
programmes of aid to reactionary governments’.\textsuperscript{78} On 22 May, the State Department
informed President Truman that the elections represented ‘the culmination of
democratic development in Turkey, [w]hich, in a remarkably short period of time, has
evolved from absolute monarchy to the multi-party system under the guidance of a
benevolent dictatorship’. The memorandum gave great credit to President İnönü for
fostering this effect ‘even though it has meant the defeat of his party’.\textsuperscript{79}

On 25 June 1950, the Korean War broke out and the newly elected DP cabinet
resolved to send troops in order to demonstrate solidarity with the United States and
seek NATO membership. Ambassador Erkin happened to be in Turkey for a vacation
when the war started. In a meeting with President Celal Bayar, Prime Minister Adnan
Menderes and Foreign Minister Fuat Köprülü, Erkin pointed out in vivid terms the
imperative for Turkey to send troops to Korea: ‘If we remain indifferent to the assault
on South Korea today, who would support us, or even care about us, if our neighbour-
in-question [the Soviet Union] attacks us tomorrow?’ His superiors found Erkin’s
argument so compelling that, contrary to his suggestion, they decided to combine the
decision to send troops with an official application to NATO.\textsuperscript{80}

The Americans welcomed the former Turkish decision but were irritated with the
latter one. Assistant Secretary of State George McGhee called 25 June a day ‘which will
long be remembered in Turkey, just as it will be remembered in the United States and
in other countries of the free world’.\textsuperscript{81} WCR Radio of New York City called Turkey’s
offer ‘meaningful’ as it ‘sat in front of the Soviet barrel’.\textsuperscript{82} But in an executive session in
a Senate foreign relations committee hearing in the autumn of 1950, Secretary of State
Acheson called the Turkish bid for NATO membership ‘foolish’ and associated it with
the DP, which he labelled as ‘[a] very inexperienced group who had not had any prior
experience in government’.\textsuperscript{83}

That the DP government never sought the Assembly’s approval was another
interesting facet of the Turkish decision to send troops to Korea. The 1924
Constitution clearly stated that only the Grand National Assembly could declare war, but it did not say anything about situations other than a state of war. As such, the DP government (perhaps emboldened by President Truman’s ‘police action’ label) argued that it was not declaring war, but merely sending troops to a foreign country. Therefore, it did not seek the legislature’s consent. Even though the DP cabinet’s decision stood on dubious constitutional grounds (İnönü and RPP deputies argued that it did), Washington did not make it an issue.

Contrary to common thinking, and the euphoric tone in the American media, the decision to deploy troops did not automatically result in Turkey’s NATO membership. As had been the case prior to the outbreak of the Korean War, Ambassador Erkin was not able to get a definitive reply from the State Department on Turkish accession to NATO. With some frustration over Turkish persistence, Paul Nitze, the director of the State Department’s policy planning staff, analysed that ‘in the absence of a compelling event’, such as a clear danger of a Soviet invasion of Turkey, there was no reason for Turkey to join the Atlantic Alliance. In a sense, wrote Nitze, a premature Turkish entry into the alliance would be a self-fulfilling prophecy and give credibility to ‘Soviet fears of encirclement and their thesis of aggressive Western intentions’, prompting a Soviet attack against Turkey.

The background to Turkey’s NATO membership is fairly intricate. Since the late 1940s, the United States and Britain had been working on a Middle East Defence Organization (MEDO) in which Greece, Turkey, Egypt, and Iran would be allied with Britain. London wanted to retain its predominance in the eastern Mediterranean by heading MEDO. The British plan, however, did not survive long; the Greeks and Turks did not regard MEDO as an alternative to NATO. Moreover, the rise of anti-British sentiment in Egypt and Iran compromised the prospects of a pro-western security pact that covered the eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East. Although the United States initially assisted Britain with the MEDO plan, it dropped the idea in July 1951. The historian Toru Onozawa argues it was at this point that the State Department and the US military came to a consensus that Turkey should be included in NATO as a cornerstone of the political and military build-up of the Middle East.

Why the change of heart? In 1949, the Truman administration was not ready to accept Greece and Turkey into NATO for economic and political reasons. But once the Korean War broke out, the side advocating NATO membership gained in influence. According to the historian Ekavi Athanassopoulou, ‘Ankara resisted the idea that small states had to be pawns of big powers in international politics’. In the final analysis, says Athanassopoulou, ‘the U.S. decision to extend a security guarantee to Turkey was the combined result of Washington’s [l]ine of security thinking and Turkey’s consistent diplomatic pressure’.

Even though the United States continued furnishing Turkey with military aid after 1947, without a formal security guarantee the Turks signalled their unwillingness to side with the West in case a war broke out with the Soviets. According to the Turkish historian Haluk Ülman, ‘Turkey tied the American use of Turkish airfields to its membership into NATO; [as such], the United States saw no other option but to accept Turkey into NATO.’
By the second half of 1951, it became clear that the West would need Greece and Turkey in the event of a war. The only option guaranteeing that outcome was full membership of NATO. As Acheson put it, ‘if the [Soviet] attack came in Western Europe, there is nothing which would make the Turks or the Greeks take any move, unless they were included in NATO.’ At the North Atlantic Council’s Ottawa meeting in September 1951, Acheson convinced the Europeans that the two countries’ membership would be the safest (and most cost-effective) way to strengthen the alliance. Greece and Turkey became full members in 1952.

Transition to democracy did not affect Turkey’s relations with the United States and did not lead to its NATO membership at the beginning of the Cold War. American decision-makers worked to align Turkey with their country in a way that would best serve their interests. That Turkey transformed itself into a democracy while contemporaneously becoming a US ally should not lead to the simplistic conclusion that Washington ‘persuaded’ Ankara to democratize. Turkey does not fit the standard explanation that takes post-Second World War Germany and Japan as the norm and analyses other cases in that light. In this instance, not only was there no urging, but many American decision-makers indeed remained sceptical about Turkey’s experiment.

Americans like to think that they have a mission to spread democracy around the world. Even before the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the subsequent ‘Greater Middle East Project’, many observers had characterized the United States as a democratizing power. Some viewed America’s role in the Cold War in ‘missionary’ terms. The political scientist Tony Smith has argued that throughout the twentieth century (and even before that), the United States pushed for democracy in countries that were in its sphere of influence.

Another important proponent of that thinking has been the political scientist G. John Ikenberry. According to Ikenberry, the American idea of promoting democracy in foreign countries reflects a pragmatic and sophisticated understanding of how to create a stable international political order and a congenial security environment. Under this ‘liberal grand strategy’ the United States is in a more advantageous situation ‘to pursue its interests, reduce security threats, and create a stable political order when other states — particularly the major great powers — are democracies rather than non-democracies’. In line with the belief in a global ‘democratic peace’, the promotion of democracy constituted a peculiar element in US foreign policy to enhance American prosperity and security.

But the exigencies of the Cold War imposed themselves upon American officials in such a way that they had to choose between undemocratic governments hostile to communism and democratic regimes. On more than a few occasions, they chose the former. As international relations expert Steve Smith points out, ‘the US historically supported “democracy” when this was a useful way of undermining pro-Soviet regimes, but was also equally happy to undermine indigenous democratic regimes when they tilted towards Moscow.’ In other words, Smith continues, ‘democracy promotion has not been a goal, let alone the goal, of US foreign policy in the twentieth century.’
Several comparisons would be useful to elucidate the point. In contrast to Germany and Japan, Portugal, a founding member of NATO, did not democratize until the 1980s. The importance of Portugal for US planners had to do with the Azores and Portugal’s proximity to bases in Europe and the Mediterranean. Strategic considerations trumped any qualms about Prime Minister Antonio de Oliveira Salazar’s pseudo-fascist estado novo (new state). According to the political scientist Luc Crollen, Salazar ‘never made any secret of his profoundly reactionary views and his hatred of parliamentary government, democracy, equality, universal suffrage and, up to a certain point, even progress’. As a founding member of NATO, Salazar expressed surprise as to why the preamble of the NAT was phrased in idealistic terms. Asking the Portuguese parliament to rubber-stamp the treaty in 1949, Salazar quipped how ‘the definition of the ideology [of the North Atlantic Treaty] is sullied by emptiness and the vagueness of certain hackneyed and vain formulas which are used everywhere with most different meanings’. The treaty, Salazar believed, should have been limited to anti-communism instead of ‘asserting principles of a civilization it was thought necessary to defend’.

The case of Spain was even more telling. Following the Second World War, Francisco Franco’s regime came under attack from the international community. Some governments argued that it was incumbent upon the United Nations to change Spain’s fascist government because it was built with support from Hitler and Mussolini. The resentment against Franco was so strong that Spain could not participate in the San Francisco Conference of April 1945 that created the UN.

In 1946, the Spanish question came before the UN Security Council. But adopting sanctions against Spain became very hard because the United States and Britain hesitated to alienate Franco at a time when relations with the Soviet Union were deteriorating. By 1947, American planners realized that if war broke out between the United States and the Soviet Union, they would need Spain as a strategic retreat for their troops in Western Europe and to stage further air-strikes against the Soviets. In 1951, Carlton Hayes, former US ambassador to Madrid, summarized his country’s stance as follows: ‘Collaboration with Spain requires [an] overcoming of democratic scruples about Franco’s government, which is a kind of dictatorship – a military and anti-communist dictatorship’. It was not unusual, Hayes argued, for the United States to collaborate with dictatorships to preserve its interests. The United States bestowed ‘favors on Marshal Tito’s communist dictatorship in Yugoslavia, [on] Portugal, which has the same kind of dictatorship as Spain, [and on] Latin American governments, which have been imposed by military putsch’. Even though Spain did not enter NATO until 1982, it was effectively integrated to American military plans in Europe during the Cold War.

As the historical record and scholarly studies show, neither at the critical junctures in Turkish politics nor during their routine discussions did American officials put pressure on the Turkish side about democratization. Even Greek American and Armenian American groups, much dreaded by the Turks, supported their country’s alliance with Turkey in the 1940s and 1950s. Since realist calculations did not leave too much room vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, US planners did not really care about
Turkey’s transition. The record from the JCS and the State Department regarding Turkey reveal the primacy of strategy over democracy.

But democracy was not completely irrelevant to policy-makers in Washington. The rhetoric of democracy, coupled with the Soviet ‘menace’, made perfect sense to American audiences when their officials referred to democracy in Turkey. The rhetoric was somehow a part of US strategy towards Turkey because it garnered public, and more importantly congressional support. In 1947–48, without Republican support for Truman’s policies, it would have been impossible to extend aid to Greece and Turkey. For that reason, the Truman administration’s policy of flexible realpolitik, which accommodated Turkey’s transition and promoted US interests at the same time, was prudent.

In the final analysis, democracy came to life in Turkey because of İnönü’s sense of mission. US rhetoric and strategy would not have made much difference had Atatürk’s best friend and second-in-command not opted for democracy. If İnönü actually used democracy as a means to advance the American–Turkish partnership, it is questionable as to why he did that without any inducement from Washington. İnönü’s endorsement of the DP and his dedication to Atatürk’s legacy decided the final outcome. Without his guidance during the initial stages, Turkish democracy, even in its problematic form, may not have come about. When Turkey experienced a military intervention in May 1960 (an action that İnönü supported only post facto because of the DP’s increasing dictatorial tendencies in the late 1950s), the United States did not protest or re-evaluate its alliance with Turkey. US–Turkish relations stayed their course.

In the 1970s, the political scientist Dankwart Rustow praised İnönü as having ‘the singular honour of being the world’s only statesman who voluntarily abdicated his dictatorial powers so as to make democracy possible.’ President Truman was somewhat less modest. In a private letter he wrote after leaving the White House, Truman exclaimed that he had ‘kept Stalin out of Greece and Turkey’ and had ‘saved them’. That was in fact true, but İnönü and not Truman gave democracy to Turkey. Despite being an absolute dictator, he spawned a new era in his country that ended in his ‘victorious’ defeat.

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Notes


[2] According to historian David Schmitz, at the meeting of US chiefs of mission in Rio de Janeiro in March 1950, George Kennan discussed how ‘Turkey and Portugal are examples of nations which have been successful in repressing Communism’. ‘It is better’, Kennan continued, ‘to have a strong regime in power than a liberal government if it is indulgent and relaxed...
and penetrated by Communists’. Kennan quoted in Schmitz, *Thank God They’re On Our Side*, 149.


[13] For the discussion on the relationship between Turkey’s Kemalist legacy, İnönü’s role, and democratization, aside from the studies mentioned in notes 5 through 9, see Ahmad, *The Turkish Experiment in Democracy*; Mango, ‘Atatürk’; Heper, ‘İsmet İnönü’.


[25] Loy W. Henderson, ‘Memorandum on Turkey’ Washington, 21 October 1946, *IAT*, reel 1; ‘Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of War (Patterson) and the Secretary of the Navy (Forrestal)’, *FRUS*, 1946, 7: 856–8; ‘Memorandum on Turkey Prepared in the Division of Near Eastern Affairs’, *FRUS*, 1946, 7: 895.


[33] Edwin Wilson to the Secretary of State, telegram no. 1352, Ankara, 19 October 1945, IAT, reel 1.


[41] ‘Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of War (Patterson) and the Secretary of the Navy (Forrestal)’, *FRUS*, 1947, 5: 112.


As much as those numbers might seem impressive, the military aid was a great bargain for the American side. In April 1954, Major General George C. Stuart told a House of Representatives committee that, because of the low salary of Turkish conscripts, ‘Turkey had an annual maintenance cost of $20 a head, as compared with $1100 in Europe and $3000 in the United States’.


Ibrāhīm, ‘Cumhurbaskam İsmet İnönü’nün Tebliğleri’, 15.


McGhee, The US–Turkish–NATO Middle East Connection, 56.

Erkin, Dışişlerinde 34 Yıl, 2–1: 25.

Sadak, ‘Turkey Faces the Soviets’.

‘Memorandum of Conversation’ , Washington, 12 April 1949, NARA, RG 59, Central Decimal Files, 711.6711–2645–711.6822/12-3145, Box 3392; ‘Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State’, FRUS, 1949, 6: 1647–53; Erkin, Dışişlerinde 34 Yıl, 2–1: 66.

‘Memorandum of Conversation – Mr. Webb, Mr. Feridun C. Erkin, Mr. John D. Jernegan’, George McGhee Files, Box 19.


US Department of State, Policy Statement, 1.


Derin, Çankaya Özel Kalemını Anımsarken, 242–3.

Toker, Demokrasimizin İsmet Paşalı Yılları, 1: 94.


Comments on the Turkish Elections of May 14, 1950, George McGhee Files, Box 19.

‘Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State to the President’, FRUS, 1950, 5: 1262. The State Department forwarded an almost identical note to Senator Tom Connally
(Democrat, Texas), chairman of the Senate foreign relations committee, on 24 May. See ‘Discussion with Senator Connally on the Senate Elections’, NARA, RG 59, Decimal Files, 1950–54, 781.58/1-2851-782.00/6-2851, Box 4062.

[80] Erkin, Dışişlerinde 34 Yıl, 2–1: 153.


[82] Dr. Halim Alyot (Director-General, Bureau of the Press & Broadcasting) to Basri Aktas (Private Secretary to the Prime Minister), Ankara, 5 August 1950, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Devlet Arşivleri, 30.01/102.630.8.


[87] Onozawa, ‘Formation of American Regional Policy’, 128. Also see Yeşilbursa, ‘Turkey’s Participation in the Middle East Command and its Admission to NATO’.


[90] ‘Report by the Secretary of State on European Problems’, Executive Session of Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 82nd Congress, First Session, 451.

[91] The memoirs of Ambassador Erkin and Zeki Kuneralp, private secretary to the Secretary-General of the Turkish Foreign Ministry, also reflect the fact that democracy had no bearing on American–Turkish relations. See Erkin, Dışişlerinde 34 Yıl and Kuneralp, Just a Diplomat.

[92] Smith, America’s Mission. Tony Smith has been deeply troubled by the implications of his defence of liberal internationalism and the way President George W. Bush has implemented ‘democratization’ in the Middle East. See Smith’s Pact with the Devil.


[94] Owen, Liberal Peace, Liberal War; Brown, Debating the Democratic Peace.


[96] The preamble reads as follows: ‘The Parties to this Treaty reaffirm their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all governments. They are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law’. ‘The North Atlantic Treaty’ available from http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/treaty.htm; accessed 21 January 2008. Salazar’s remarks from Crollen, Portugal, the US, and NATO, 48–9.

[97] Liedtke, Embracing a Dictatorship, 23–32.


[99] Hayes, The United States and Spain, 181.


[102] In fact, fearing that he would try to stop them, members of the military junta that carried out the coup did not inform İnönü beforehand. See Toker, Demokrasimizin İsmet Paşahı Yılları, 5: 21. Following the coup, a group within the junta began campaigning against democracy and political parties, with the pretext that they caused instability. In an article published in various papers on 9 September 1960, İnönü came forward in defence of democracy and
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began clashing with the junta. The article is available as İnönü, ‘Democracy and Revolution in Turkey’, 314–7.
[103] Rustow, 'Modernization of Turkey', 113.
[104] Ferrell, Off the Record, 368.

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